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The paper looks at security relations in the Asia Pacific region with a special 
focus on China, India and Pakistan. In doing so, the paper applies Gerald 
Segal's model to these case studies and tries to make an assessment as to 
how secure or insecure the region is. The four factors which have been 
taken into consideration to make this assessment include the nature of 
political systems, the levels of economic inter dependence, the role played 
by regional organisations and the balance of power. Finally, the paper 
argues, whilst some of these areas look good, a lot of them don't and much 
more needs to be done to make the region more secure. Going by this 
assessment, the prospects for security, by and large, look bleak. 
 















ASSESSING SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC: THE CASES OF CHINA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
INTRODUCTION:  
The term ‘Asia Pacific’ is a hugely contested term. Scholars in the area of Asian Studies are 
not united when it comes to defining the term ‘Asia Pacific’, and its geographical location. It means 
different things to different people, and the massive body of scholarly literature on the topic is 
highly fragmented. Whilst some scholars take a broad view of the ‘Asia Pacific’, some others take a 
much more narrow and restricted approach. ‘As the Asia Pacific contains so many different states 
with relatively little in common makes developing a common position or perspective difficult if not 
impossible’ (Beeson and Stone, 2014).  Those who define the term in a broad way, for them the ‘Asia 
Pacific’ consists of East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia taken collectively. For those who take a 
much more restricted approach, they primarily refer to East Asia when they are talking about the 
Asia Pacific. East Asia can be further sub divided into South East Asia, North East Asia, and China. 
Iran is like a bridge country which connects the Asia Pacific to the Middle East. Going by the broad 
definition, the ‘Asia Pacific’ stretches from the Philippines in the east to Pakistan in the west and 
from Mongolia and Japan in the north to the South East Asian archipelago in the south. Thus the 
definition of the Asia Pacific has both expanded and contracted over the past few years in the 
existing body of scholarly literature.  
For purposes of this paper, the term the ‘Asia Pacific’ will refer primarily to India, Pakistan 
and China. In other words, this paper makes use of the broad approach, taking two countries from 
South Asia (India and Pakistan) and one country from East Asia (China). It is the aim of this paper to 
make an assessment of the security and stability in the ‘Asia Pacific’ specifically focussing on these 
three countries. In doing so, the paper tries to make use of Gerald Segal’s model for security analysis 
(Segal, 1997), and tries to apply the Segal model in the context of these three case studies. The 
paper asks the question: is there any possibility of having a security community firstly in South Asia 
itself, and then secondly in South Asia plus China? Finally, the paper argues whilst some areas look 
good, a lot of other areas don’t. In other words, whilst it may seem that a security community is on 
the rise in the region that this paper considers, there is still a long way to go, and much more needs 
to be done. The analysis in this paper will show that going by the Segal model, by and large, the 
future of this region still seems to be fraught with much peril and uncertainty.  The uniqueness of 
the paper is that it applies the Segal model to China, India and Pakistan, and makes an assessment of 
security relations as far as these three countries are concerned. Earlier writings and more 
contemporary ones tend to focus on security relations between China and the rest of East Asia, the 
South China Sea dispute being one very common area, which has been widely written about. 
International relations and security concerns between China and the rest of the subcontinent is a 
topic which has not got the same sort of attention as China’s relations with the rest of East Asia have 
had in the academic literature.      
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: GERALD SEGAL’S FOUR INGREDIENTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY  
Whilst making an assessment of the security of a region, Segal (Segal, 1997) in his paper, 
‘How Insecure is Pacific Asia?’, which was published in the journal, International Affairs, talks about 
four factors which need to be taken into consideration, namely: nature of the political system of the 
countries that are being studied, levels of economic interdependence that exists amongst those 
countries, the role played by regional organisations to maintain security and stability, and the 
balance of power. Segal argues that more the number of democracies in a particular region, safer 
that region is. Segal argues higher the levels of economic interdependence amongst countries in that 
particular region, safer the region. Segal also looks at the role played by regional organisations to 
maintain stability and security. And finally, Segal emphasises on the balance of power and argues 
that major shifts in the balance of power in a region are likely to have an adverse impact on the 
stability of that region.  These factors collectively need to be analysed within the broader framework 
of the region that is being studied. So let us now analyse these four factors within the context of the 
‘Asia Pacific’ focusing primarily on India, Pakistan and China.   
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS:  
 Whilst making an assessment of security and stability of any region whether Europe, South 
Asia, the Middle East or South East Asia, one firstly needs to look at the nature of the political 
systems in that particular region or that part of the world that is being studied/considered. If most or 
all of the countries of that region are democratic, then the chances are that that part of world or 
that region will be peaceful or is likely to be peaceful, secure and stable. This is because democracies 
are seen to be peace loving. Democratic nations are seen to be peace loving, which engage in 
dialogue with one another when there is a dispute, as opposed to going to war. By and large, 
democracies believe in compromise, in negotiation and appreciate the healthy role of criticism. They 
believe that constructive criticism and debate paves the way for progress. They show tolerance to 
differences in opinion over a particular issue. They do not believe in a policy of might is right and 
political high handedness. In other words, democracies talk things through with one another if a 
dispute arises and do not go to war with one another just because they have had differences in 
opinion over something. This is very much in keeping with the democratic peace theory which states 
that democracies do not go to war with one another (Baylis and Smith, 2001). The more politically 
pluralistic countries are in a particular region, the safer that region is. In contrast, authoritarian 
regimes are not seen as very compromising and tend to wage war with other surrounding countries 
when there are differences in opinion over something. Democracies are seen as friendlier, in 
contrast to authoritarian regimes. That said, it could be argued that it is the world’s largest 
democracies which are waging war in the world today: the United States and Great Britain in the 
Middle East and South-Central Asia, Israel in Palestine and India in Kashmir. But without looking at 
this too critically, for the sake of argument let us say that democracies are peaceful by nature. So let 
us look at how many democracies there are in the region that this paper is considering.  
 In the south Asian region, the only country that has been a well-established democracy is 
India. India is the world’s largest democracy, not going by area, but going by number of people. 
Since India became independent from British colonial rule in 1947, it has successfully held free and 
fair elections and has had huge success with democracy. Some western scholars thought after 1947 
democracy would not take root in India because of its cultural diversity, and because it is a society 
that has millions living below the poverty line. In other words, there are too many racial, ethnic, 
religious, economic and linguistic divides in India, which could potentially pave the way for 
instability. To have a democracy, it was assumed that there needs to be an element of cultural 
homogeneity and a rising middle class. When India started out as an independent nation, it had 
neither. It was very diverse from a cultural standpoint, and economically one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Despite the cultural diversity and economic challenges, India has had success 
with democracy right from the start and has never slipped into a dictatorship even when it went 
through a phase of crises. So it is a well-accepted fact now that India is the world’s largest 
democracy. Of course, Indian democracy has not been without problems, particularly with the rise of 
Hindu nationalism in recent years. The rise of Hindu nationalism is proving to be a threat for 
minorities, particularly Muslim and Christian minorities. Since the BJP came into power in the year 
2014, there have been numerous attacks on Christian and Muslim groups and also on intellectuals 
who have advocated ideas that do not sit well with the ideas of the dominant political party, the BJP. 
Democracy is not just about conducting free and fair elections but is also about protecting the rights 
of minority citizens. In recent years it seems that India has failed to protect minority rights in certain 
parts of the country. Even when we look at the electoral process, elections in an independent India 
have not always been free and fair. For instance, it is well known that in places like Kashmir, 
elections have been rigged, ballot boxes have been tampered with, and voters have been harassed 
and intimidated. New Delhi’s policy in Kashmir has been aggressive and one of crackdown. India’s 
conduct in Kashmir since 1947 till the present day is like a black mark on its democracy. Corruption is 
also entrenched in different parts of the country, particularly in the north east. Democracy is not just 
about political democracy and having the right to vote but it is also about social and economic 
democracy. With regards to social democracy, we have already stated that minority citizens have 
come under attack like Muslims in Kashmir, and when we look at economic democracy, India still has 
a long way to go in terms of lifting people out of poverty. Despite its recent impressive economic 
growth rates, and its rising middle class, there are millions of people living below the poverty line, 
and India has a long way to go if it wants to have success with economic democracy. It has to lift 
these millions out of poverty, give them jobs and provide them with economic security. People need 
to have access to food security, health security and basic education. On a more positive note and to 
take a more balanced approach it is worth mentioning that, India has had a civil rights regime which 
predates that of the United States, and it started with Gandhi. India actively follows a policy of 
positive discrimination and affirmative action as far as both Christian and Muslim minorities are 
concerned. For instance, in the areas of jobs and education seats at the university level and posts in 
government jobs are often reserved for minority candidates particularly from minority provinces (or 
states as they are called) in India like Kashmir (which is predominantly Muslim) and Nagaland and 
Mizoram in the northeast (which are predominantly Christian). The Indian government has also tried 
pumping money into these borderland minority areas for infrastructure development, although the 
money may have been misused by local politicians. And whilst there maybe problems with India’s 
policy of positive discrimination and the way it has been implemented since independence in 1947, 
there is no doubt that from a philosophical and moral standpoint, India deserves credit in trying to 
empower its minority citizens. India is most certainly a country of contradictions. Whilst repression 
of Muslim minorities in Kashmir is one part of the India story, empowerment of minorities and 
positive discrimination is another side of the same coin.  So, in the south Asian region, India, which 
occupies about seventy per cent of the territory, is most certainly a democracy, although a very 
messy one. What about the other countries in South Asia? 
 Whilst India’s democracy is a very messy one, it still has the democratic label, and boasts of 
being the world’s largest democracy. India’s democratic label has not really ever been contested. 
Whilst there are countries in the Asia Pacific that have experienced temporary democracy, and 
slipped into authoritarian styles of government particularly during times of crises, India’s democratic 
credentials have been strong and is generally not disputed by those scholars working on South Asia. 
The other countries which surround India have, however, struggled with democracy. Take Pakistan, 
for instance.  Both India and Pakistan came into existence in the same year in 1947. Despite a 
common British colonial legacy, India became democratic and Pakistan faced waves of military rule. 
Why was this the case? Scholars like Ayesha Jalal (Jalal, 1995) talk about the inheritances during the 
time of partition. India was lucky to inherit the central state apparatus which the British created 
during their two hundred years of rule in the subcontinent, whereas Pakistan did not get as much.  
This central state apparatus which Jalal talks about includes the administrative structures, the 
bureaucracy, the high courts and universities, all of which are required for the smooth functioning of 
a democracy. India was in that sense lucky to have inherited much of the central state apparatus left 
by the British, which it used as a platform to take off with democracy in the post-independence 
phase. Pakistan on the other hand had to start from scratch. This is one of the key arguments put 
forward in the existing body of scholarly literature as to why India became democratic and Pakistan 
faced waves of authoritarian rule despite a common British colonial legacy. Therefore, one needs to 
look at the strategic and economic consequences during partition. However, there are a whole range 
of other factors which have prevented the rise of democracy in Pakistan, which we shall discuss 
shortly.  
 Mukherjee builds on Jalal’s theory and argues that India not only inherited the British central 
state apparatus, but also the better geographical parts of the subcontinent, which are suitable for 
agricultural cultivation that helped the Indian economy (Mukherjee, 2010). For instance, the large 
fertile Indo Gang etic plain in north India is well suited for food crop cultivation, and the Deccan in 
southern India is well suited for cash crop cultivation like cotton. Both of these helped the Indian 
economy, and as the Indian economy did well, there was a rising middle class intelligentsia, who are 
generally the movers and shakers for change and make the society and whole political system more 
pluralistic.  In contrast, large parts of Pakistan, particularly in the north western frontier provinces 
are hilly and mountainous, which do not make the environment suitable for cultivation. The harsh 
geography has had an adverse impact on the economy. In addition to the mountains, the deserts of 
Pakistan also do not make the environment suitable for agricultural cultivation. This too has had an 
adverse knock on effect on Pakistan’s economy. As the Pakistani economy struggled, the middle 
class intelligentsia did not rise the way it did in India. Since the rising middle class in Pakistan was not 
as pronounced as it was in the Indian case, the semi feudal elements consolidated their position in 
Pakistan. The middle class intelligentsia are generally seen as the movers and shakers of change who 
could have brought political change in Pakistan, paving the way for progress. The rising middle class 
intelligentsia ordinarily comes into existence when the economy does well and geography can often 
(not always) go a long way in helping a country’s economy.   
 The other factors which scholars tend to talk about that have prevented the rise of 
democracy in contemporary Pakistan include the strong presence of semi feudal or aristocratic 
elements in Pakistani society, the weakness and lack of political vision of civilian leaders, the dismal 
state of the judiciary and the fact that the civilian leaders did not use the gaps in between military 
rule to establish a strong civilian democratic government (Haqqani, 2006). The rise of Islamist groups 
who are also trying to flex their muscles politically has further exacerbated the situation in 
contemporary Pakistan (Mukherjee, 2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that the military 
(backed by the ISI/Inter-Services Intelligence) has a very powerful position in Pakistan’s domestic 
politics who have not allowed the more democratic groups to come to the political forefront. The 
military has argued that till the Kashmir dispute with India gets resolved, they need to stay in power 
for purposes of national security. They further argue that there are security threats not just from the 
east from India, but also from the west from Afghanistan particularly with the rise and spread of the 
Taliban insurgency in recent times (Paul, 2014). To add more fuel to the fire, there are also internal 
challenges which need to be dealt with by the military before western style democracy can be 
introduced in the country. The country is in a state of emergency, and till the country has reached a 
state of normalcy, the military has to act as the guardian of Pakistani society. In other words, 
concentration of power must be in the hands of the military because of the crises situation Pakistani 
is currently in. The military has always used this situation as an excuse to stay in power. Today, 
although the military does not rule or govern the country directly, it calls the shots from the side 
lines (Rizvi, 2000). Although some might call Pakistan a fledgling democracy today, the real power 
still rests with the military. The military is happy to govern the country from the side lines so long the 
civilian leaders do not attack their corporate interests. Because the military has been in power for so 
long since independence (particularly with the military rule of Ayub Khan, Yayha Khan, General Zia 
and Musharraff), their long rule has paved the way for their presence in the corporate sector, 
businesses, education and communication systems. So there is no need to govern the country 
directly. It can be done indirectly or in more subtle ways, which is often termed as soft intervention 
or indirect rule. There are senior civil servants, who originally came from a military background 
which only makes the society more authoritarian in nature. What has complicated the situation 
further is the weakness of democratic leaders. Every time there is a crisis, Pakistan’s history has 
shown us that the more democratic elements begin to lean on the military for support instead of 
solving the issue at hand themselves. We have seen, particularly in matters of national security and 
governance, civilian leaders have often leaned on the military for support. So what we see in the 
Pakistani case is more of a situation of grey. It is difficult to put black or white labels on the Pakistani 
political system because now the civilian leaders have come to share a strong political relationship 
with the powerful military, although this relationship is very much a strained one. The more 
appropriate term to describe the Pakistani system is hybrid government. Political hybridity is a good 
way to describe the political system here, where there are both elements of democracy and 
authoritarian elements coexisting within the same political system, although the tilt is more in 
favour of the military.  
 So there are clear problems with South Asian democracies. In the Indian context, we have 
seen the rise of Hindutva, and Pakistan is at best a hybrid regime or a fledgling democracy. But today 
both have the democratic label.  Without going into the details of Indian and Pakistani domestic 
politics and analysing how good or bad they are as democracies, if we just go by the label, 
‘democracy’, the two countries still have very problematic relations over Kashmir, and war is likely to 
break out at any time, despite being democratic. This is of course not in keeping with the democratic 
peace theory which states that two democracies do not go to war with each another. Kashmir is a 
flashpoint which has gripped both countries. In this connection mention maybe made of xenophobia 
on both sides: Hindutva on the Indian side and Islamist tendencies on the other side. Pakistan’s 
claims on Kashmir are irredentist and relates to identity politics. For some in the political elite in 
Islamabad, Pakistan’s national identity will not be complete unless it captures the whole of Kashmir 
since it is a Muslim majority province leaning against Pakistan’s national frontier. For India, Kashmir 
is important because if Kashmir as a minority borderland province secedes then this may have a 
domino effect and may set an example to other disgruntled and disaffected groups residing in other 
parts of India’s borderlands. So Kashmir is important to both countries, but for different reasons. 
Most analysts would agree that there is every possibility of the two countries, despite their 
democratic labels, of going to war with each other over Kashmir, which is not in keeping with the 
democratic peace theory but in this case one really needs to look at the quality of democracy in 
South Asia. Whilst Indian democracy is a messy one and has been undermined by Hindutva, Pakistan 
has only just started experiencing democratic tendencies. So if India is having problems with its 
neighbours then it is primarily because from a qualitative standpoint, India does not score high 
marks with regard to its democratic credentials, and also the surrounding neighbours have not 
experienced democracy yet in a meaningful way.  
  
The other countries of South Asia have also struggled with democracy. Bangladesh, for 
instance, was a part of Pakistan till the liberation war broke out in 1971. It was in the year 1971 that 
former East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan, and became the independent country of 
Bangladesh (Sengupta, 2011). So till 1971, Bangladesh was ruled by the military generals who ruled 
Pakistan namely Ayub Khan and General Yayha Khan. After independence from West Pakistan, in the 
post 1971 phase, Bangladesh slipped into a military dictatorship on two occasions under Zia ur 
Rahman (1976-1981) and General Mohammed Ershad (1982-1990). And although Khaleda Zia’s and 
Sheikh Hasina’s government in the post nineties phase promised democracy for the people of 
Bangladesh, older military elements were still very powerful. Whilst it may seem that Bangladesh is 
democratising at a superficial level, scratch the surface and you will see that the real power rests in 
the hands of more conservative elements. In recent years, the rise of Islamist groups have 
significantly undermined and weakened democracy in Bangladesh, similar to the situation in 
Pakistan. There has been much talk about whether or not Bangladesh will turn into the next 
Afghanistan (Karlekar, 2005). Afghanistan is often seen as a failed state where Islamists groups had 
taken over politics, particularly when the Taliban was in power. And although the situation in 
Afghanistan has somewhat improved now, the country still has to grapple with Islamist groups 
causing havoc in the AFPAK/Afghanistan-Pakistan region (Rashid, 2009). Finally, when one looks at 
countries like Nepal and Bhutan, both countries have experienced a monarchy till very recent times.  
 
 Moving away from South Asia, let us now take a look at our other case study, the only case 
study that we have from East Asia, which is China. China has been labelled as an authoritarian state 
with the CCP/Chinese Communist Party ruling the country ever since the PRC/People’s Republic of 
China came into existence in 1949. China by most scholars has been classified as a one party state 
although there is a lot of revisionist literature that has come out focussing on the more 
democratising tendencies within the overarching centralised Chinese political system. Sometimes, 
the term democratic centralism has been used to describe the Chinese political system, which 
basically refers to centralism at the centre in Beijing, and democracy at the more peripheral parts of 
China. Recent revisionist literature by scholars such as Jude Howell from the London School of 
Economics has recognised that there is flexibility within the Chinese authoritarian system, and that it 
is not as authoritarian as it is made out to be. Since the late seventies, from the time of Deng 
Xiaoping, decentralisation of power has taken place (Mitter, 2008). We see the rise and spread of 
competitive village elections, the changing patterns in which individuals are being recruited to high 
profile party positions, the reform of the civil service, the gradual spread of rule of law and the 
invigoration of local and national parliaments (Howell, 2003). Even historically, China has had a 
strong tradition of resistance to oppression, and there is a substantial body of protest literature. 
Traditional Chinese culture was not without some element of liberalism and sanction of popular 
assertiveness. For instance, village politics was less despotic than national politics and the Taoists 
were philosophical anarchists who often advocated a kind of laissez-faire in both economics and 
politics (Mukherjee, 2010). From the late seventies onwards, we see the rise of literature that is 
centred on demands for democracy, civil liberties etc. The situation in the Chinese case is quite 
complicated like Pakistan and India. It is difficult to put a simplistic label on the nature of the political 
system since there are elements of both democracy and authoritarian elements coexisting within 
the same political system, although the tilt is more towards authoritarianism, like the Pakistani case. 
It is important to note that sometimes labelling countries and trying to fit them or into boxes can be 
highly problematic. Trying to force countries into boxes will only distort our understanding of world 
politics. It is important to make use of a more nuanced analysis and take a more critical approach. 
Attention should be given to the shades of grey and political complexities rather than putting black 
or white labels on them. Although India has the democratic label, we have seen that it is quite a 
messy democracy and that New Delhi has made use of undemocratic ways in places like Kashmir. 
That said, the tilt in the Indian case is more towards democracy. Similarly, although the Chinese 
system has the label of being a one party state, there is a much bigger and much more complex 
picture over here with democratising tendencies in the more peripheral parts of the country, but 
then again, the tilt in the Chinese case is definitely more towards the authoritarian model.   
Now that we have considered the nature of the political systems of all our case studies, what 
are the implications for security in the Asia Pacific? India is the only democracy although a very 
messy one, whilst all the other neighbouring countries in South Asia have struggled with democracy, 
and have faced incessant waves of military rule, particularly Pakistan. China also is a one party state. 
And whilst we acknowledged that recent democratic tendencies had taken place in China, by and 
large it still is authoritarian. So when we take into consideration Segal’s first ingredient to assess how 
secure or insecure a region is, that is, the nature of political systems of the countries in a given 
region, most of our case studies are authoritarian or hybrid regimes. India is the only democracy, 
and that too there are problems with Indian democracy. So, as far as the natures of political systems 
are concerned, we cannot tick this box which makes this part of the Asia Pacific insecure and 
unstable. Had all or at least most of them been democratic then we could have classified the region 
as secure or at least reasonably secure. Democracies allow for more political transparency, which in 
turn leads to confidence building amongst nations. This then paves the way for stability, but 
currently, because of the way things stand we cannot classify the region as secure when we take into 
account the nature of political systems of our case studies.  
LEVELS OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:            
     The second factor which Segal talks about is the levels of economic interdependence that exist 
amongst different countries in a given region. The argument is that if countries in a given region 
have strong economic linkages, the less likely they are to go to war with each other. Strong 
economic ties bring countries closer to each other. If country A has invested a lot of money in 
country B, then country A is not likely to go to war with country B because going to war is likely to 
have an adverse impact on both economies since both economies are intertwined with each other. 
Going to war would be self-destructive and counterproductive. The destructive effects of war will 
not only be on the country that is being attacked, but this will have adverse repercussions on the 
attacker or aggressor since the aggressor has its own money tied up with the victim country’s 
economy. In other words, stronger the economic links or higher the levels of economic 
interdependence, safer the region. Lesser the economic linkages or lower the levels of economic 
inter dependence, higher the chances of going to war with one another because it does not have 
much to lose from an economic standpoint. So lower the levels of economic interdependence, 
higher the levels of insecurity and instability.  
 Now when we look at the levels of economic interdependence within South Asia, the 
economic connections between the two dominant forces, India and Pakistan are quite depressed, 
and have traditionally been so since 1947. The Pakistani military has made it clear that unless the 
Kashmir problem (which is a territorial dispute) has been resolved between the two countries, the 
question of trading with one another doesn’t even arise. Whilst civilian leaders in Pakistan like 
Nawaz Sharif have favoured trade links with India, the more powerful military, the ISI and other 
Islamist groups do not view India favourably (Grare, 2015). In recent years there have been 
discussions of whether or not the Most Favoured Nation status in trade should be given to India or 
China. Whilst civilian leaders favoured more positive economic ties with India, the military was more 
in favour of China. Traditionally, throughout the Cold War phase, China and Pakistan have been allies 
primarily to balance India in the Asia Pacific. So it was quite easy to see why sections in the Pakistani 
military favoured China over India.  
 When we look at China’s economic relations with India, the situation is somewhat positive 
and has improved in recent years, although the boundary dispute which we shall discuss later still 
remains. As mentioned earlier, throughout the Cold War phase Pakistan had been allies with China, 
but from the late eighties and early nineties China begins to take a more even handed approach. 
India liberalises its economy in the early nineties, and opens up its markets which provides China 
with an opportunity. From the nineties onwards, China is able to sell its products in Indian markets 
and is also able to invest in India, although Chinese investment in India is often viewed with 
suspicion by Indians. Overall, from the 90’s onwards economic relations between the two giants 
improved. It was in this context that member of Indian parliament, Jairam Ramesh coined the term, 
‘Chindia’, which refers primarily to borderless integration and harmonious growth. The concept of 
‘Chindia’ thrives on good economic relations between India and China. ‘Chindia’ emphasises 
economic cooperation since we live in a globalised world of inter connectedness. It stresses on 
consolidating economic ties between India and China which will be conducive for development for 
both countries. It relates to a win-win situation. Border trade, tourism, frontier development and 
transport integration are key ideas associated with the concept of ‘Chindia’ (Mukherjee, 2014). High 
politics in this context takes a bit of a back seat and absolute profits come forward. From the 1990’s 
bilateral trade between the two countries have flourished. Central governments have focussed 
primarily on the idea of mutual gain. Between 2000 and 2005, there have been a series of high level 
visits between the two rising economic giants on the Asiatic mainland. Indians went to China to 
study the special economic zones so that this model could be used in the Indian context to further 
India’s economic growth and development. India’s IT sector is well known globally (Dutt, 2006), and 
in 2002 Indian software companies set up branches in China. Zensar technologies have trained 
Chinese software project managers in India. In 2005 strategic partnerships between the two 
countries, India and China have been signed. The visa regime in India which was quite stringent in 
earlier times has now been relaxed for Chinese citizens. In the year 2000, China’s Yunnan province 
launched the Kunming initiative to revitalise the ancient southern silk route between Assam in north 
eastern India and Yunnan. Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan province has been attracted to India’s 
IT miracle in the south Indian city of Bangalore in the state of Karnataka. In 2003, India opened up 
the Nathu La pass in the Indian state of Sikkim so that the pass could channelize large volumes of 
trade between India and China. In recent years, the Indian Chambers of Commerce are having 
regular meetings with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. There will be 
exchange of information on best monetary policy practice. Reliance industries have hired Chinese 
contractors for construction projects in India. Thus the idea of ‘Chindia’ is to focus on a symbiotic 
relationship and emphasises on a win-win situation. India has its own strengths like IT, software, 
space technology and medicine and China is number one in hardware. The idea of ‘Chindia’ is to 
exchange each other’s best bits with one another for mutual growth so that both countries can 
develop and benefit. Although the two countries are separate economies, they can be integrated 
and interlinked. Here the buzzword is complementarity and not competition. Jeremy Paltiel argues 
‘… Economic partnerships can build a platform of institutional relations that cater to the needs of 
both countries’ (Paltiel, 2012). Recently, both countries have become members of the AIIB, Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, headquartered in Beijing, China. India’s impressive economic 
growth has been partly because of Chinese investment in India. The AIIB was proposed by China 
between 2013 and 2014 (AIIB website). It should be noted that other south Asian countries like 
Bangladesh and Pakistan are also members. Both India and China are also members of the New 
Development Bank, a multilateral development bank, which was previously known as the BRICS 
Development Bank. Although the NDB is headquartered in Shanghai, the president, Mr. K.V.Kamath 
is an Indian (NDB website). ‘Chindia is viewed as primarily an economic coalition, but would 
encompass a broad range of mutually useful partnering from trade and economic development, to 
energy, the environment, social advancement and security matters. This alliance might just be the 
kind of close coalition needed to propel these two nations into super power status that otherwise 
neither might be able to achieve alone’ (Coates, 2009). ‘Today India and China have emerged in their 
own Hindu and Confucian traditions as major forces in the global economy’ (Green and Mendis, 
2008). ‘Over the past 20 years, the economies of China and India have witnessed unmatchable 
development, enjoying an average annual growth of 10 and 6.7 % respectively (Paul and Mas, 2016). 
All of this clearly shows that levels of economic inter dependence between India and China are 
rising, which makes this part of the Asia Pacific more secure, from an economic standpoint.  And 
although China is currently well ahead of India in terms of the size of the economy, its impact on 
world trade, and its per capita gross domestic product, ‘many western analysts have put their money 
on India to win the race in the end, due to its democratic structure, long standing commitment to 
the rule of law and private enterprise, and comfort with the English language’ (Edwards, 2012).  
 So from the above discussion it is clear that the economics between India and China looks 
good, although some would argue that much more would still need to be done to take things further 
and that there needs to be more exchanges happening between the two countries, and that a new 
dynamism needs to be injected into the India-China economic partnership. India’s economic 
relations with its own south Asian neighbours like Pakistan might be depressed, but the situation 
with China has changed dramatically since the nineties. Taking into consideration Segal’s second 
requirement for the maintenance of regional security and stability, this box can be ticked with 
regard to Sino-Indian relations, but not when it comes to Indo-Pak relations. In other words, China 
and India are not likely to go to war with each other in the near future because of the positive 
economic relations, although they may have on-going border disputes. Both India and China have 
decided to put the border dispute on the back burner and develop economic ties first which will 
benefit both of them, and then come back to the border dispute later on. India and Pakistan, on the 
other hand, are more likely to go to war if tensions between the two south Asian countries reach a 
height because of poor Indo-Pak economic relations.  
THE ROLE PLAYED BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS: 
 The third factor which Segal looks at for the maintenance of security and stability in a given 
region is regional organisations and the role played by regional organisations to contain security 
threats. The main regional organisation in South Asia is the SAARC. The SAARC refers to the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, founded in the mid 80’s and is headquartered at 
Kathmandu in Nepal (SAARC website). Like most other regional organisations, it was supposed to 
look into economic matters (such as trade relations between south Asian countries) and security 
concerns. The SAARC movement was spearheaded by the smaller south Asian nations especially 
Bangladesh under Zia-ur-Rahman because many of them were feeling threatened by India’s rise. The 
idea of having a collective organisation was to check the rise of Indian hegemony, or what was often 
perceived as Indian tyranny and oppression (Mukherjee, 2014).  In South Asia, India has a central 
position and borders all the other south Asian countries but the other south Asian countries do not 
have borders with one another, excepting Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. Afghanistan is the 
newest member of the SAARC, having joined the body in 2007. India is also much more powerful 
than all of its neighbours from an economic and military standpoint. Unlike other regional 
organisations like the EU and the ASEAN, both of which came into existence shortly after the Second 
World War, the SAARC took its time and came into existence in about 1985. The reason why it took 
so long is primarily because of the frosty relationship between India and Pakistan, the two dominant 
forces in South Asia. By and large, the SAARC has been ineffective in dealing with security issues in 
South Asia like transnational terrorism. Neither has it been successful on the economic front. 
Although originally, the south Asian countries were members of the SAARC i.e. India, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, in recent years this regional 
organisation has expanded to include observers, China being one.   
 Although China is not a member of the SAARC, its recent rise and economic growth gives it 
the capability to transform India’s immediate environment. There are countries which might be 
threatened by China’s rise particularly countries which have immediate borders with China, but 
there are also countries particularly some of the smaller countries in South Asia which are 
benefitting from it economically as China integrates itself into regional processes and as China 
increasingly becomes an attractive commercial partner to them. Most of the smaller countries in 
South Asia, excepting Bhutan are welcoming China to become a member of the SAARC. India is of 
course not in favour of this since India see’s South Asia as its own sphere of influence.  In other 
words, India sees South Asia as its own backyard, where East Asian powers like China do not have a 
place. Indian official policy does not welcome China’s role in the SAARC. One of the arguments that 
have been put forward is that if the SAARC is a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 
then its best to keep it at South Asia and the south Asian region. Therefore, China is not welcome 
being a part of East Asia. Although it may not be a member of the SAARC, China has observer status, 
and has been far more influential than India in South Asia. For instance, China has the ability to bring 
in more resources because of its economic strength. Because India has not had good relations with 
its neighbours till very recent times, China found it quite easy to get drawn into the South Asian 
equation. The reason why India’s immediate neighbours, who are also members of the SAARC, are 
keen for China to acquire SAARC membership is because it then balances India.   
 So when we look at Segal’s third component for maintenance of regional security in the 
South Asian context, the picture does not look very good. First of all SAARC took many years to come 
into existence which clearly shows that some of its members were not keen to have a regional 
organisation in the first place. After coming into existence, by and large the SAARC has failed to deal 
with economic issues and security concerns. What has further problematized the situation is 
whether or not China should become a member. Whilst most of India’s neighbours view China 
favourably, India does not, so the future seems to be fraught with uncertainty. Therefore, Segal’s 
third box cannot be ticked in this context.  
BALANCE OF POWER: 
 Finally, we come to Segal’s last ingredient for security, which is the balance of power. This 
point somewhat relates to the earlier point on regional organisations and how China is able to 
influence India’s immediate neighbourhood and the south Asian region. The argument put forward is 
that swift changes in the balance of power are likely to have an adverse impact on the stability and 
security of the region. Lesser the shifts in the balance of power, the more stable the region is.  
Now both India and China are emerging powers and have their own regional and global 
aspirations. Both countries will need to develop mechanisms to deal with each other’s rise.  There 
are clear conflicting spheres of influence. China as mentioned earlier has found it easy to get sucked 
into South Asia because of the preferential treatment that countries like Pakistan, Nepal and 
Bangladesh give China. India sees South Asia as its own sphere of influence, but China has huge 
potential and the capability to transform India’s immediate neighbourhood in South Asia. Both India 
and China have conflicting interests over Nepal, Myanmar and the Indian Ocean region (Myint-U, 
2011). The two countries also went to war with each other in the year 1962 primarily over Arunachal 
Pradesh, which China sees as south Tibet, and as a part of Chinese territory (Gupta, 2014). The 
Indians were badly defeated in the war of 1962.China in the past has also helped insurgent groups in 
the Indian northeast, who have spearheaded violent secessionist movements’ right after 1947 
(Lintner, 2012). In the Indian Ocean, China has followed its policy of String of Pearls, which is a 
strategy to strengthen Chinese maritime communication links in the Indian Ocean which recently 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi from India tried to counter by paying visits to islands in the Indian 
Ocean like Seychelles, Sri Lanka etc. So there are clear conflicting spheres of influence, and the 
balance of power does not seem to be stable.  
China’s rise is certainly producing a kind of apprehension amongst the countries that 
surround it although the Chinese keep on talking about their rise being peaceful, and that other 
countries will benefit from its rise. India is most certainly concerned. There are question marks about 
what implications China’s rise will have on neighbouring countries in the Asia Pacific. China also has 
the ability to transform India’s immediate neighbourhood. When we look at India and China’s 
capabilities, there is a huge asymmetry. China is much more powerful than India both economically 
and from a military standpoint. China’s share of global defence and military spending has grown 
dramatically in the last twenty years (Palamar and Jardine, 2012). In comprehensive power terms, 
China is way ahead of India. Economically, there is no comparison between the two countries 
(Tharoor, 2012). China is a ten trillion economy and India is not even two trillion. This is clearly a 
huge gulf. In other words, the Chinese are ahead of the Indians by at least two decades. Due to this 
disparity, India senses a security threat from the Chinese side. There are also outstanding issues 
which relate to territorial integrity and sovereignty. In this connection, mention maybe made of the 
border disputes that the two countries have had, particularly in the Indian northeast. India needs to 
develop mechanisms so that China’s rise can be managed. Although India’s capability do not match 
up China’s, China has to some extent tried to block India’s engagement in East Asia. Just as India 
does not want China to play an active role in South Asia, similarly China does not want India to play 
an active role in East Asia, which China sees as its own backyard. India’s Look East policy has now 
been transformed into the Act East policy, but this could very well be blocked by the Chinese to 
prevent India from gaining a strong foothold in East Asia. It should be noted though that India does 
not have the capability to decide the agenda in East Asia. But China does have the capability to 
shape the political agenda, the security agenda and the economic agenda in South Asia. Ultimately, 
it is a question of capability. India might make commitments, but has had major problems when it 
comes to implementation. 
India also does not have a strong alliance with any country in East Asia, the way China has 
for instance with Pakistan in South Asia. The China-Pakistan friendship came into existence in the 
backdrop of very classical balance of power logic. Before the Sino Indian war of 1962, there was not 
much of an alliance between China and Pakistan. However, after 1962, Pakistan and China came 
together to exert pressure on India. The Pakistani’s were able to convince the Chinese that their 
membership of military pacts like the then SEATO/South East Asia Treaty Organisation was directed 
primarily against India. China in the mid-sixties had also warned India that India would not be able to 
fight war on two fronts meaning with Pakistan in Kashmir and with China in the Indian northeast. 
Thus, Sino-Pak friendship developed in the Cold War phase, keeping India in the foreground. There 
are of course other issues which have brought China and Pakistan together (Small, 2015). In this 
connection, mention maybe made of the Gwadar port in Pakistan which acts as a strategic corridor 
for China to gain access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.  
From the late eighties onwards we begin to see a shift in China’s attitude towards India. 
From the 90’s onwards, China begins to take a more even handed approach, and the density of 
relations with India begins to increase rapidly. The degree of China’s influence in South Asia really 
depends on its relationship vis a vis India. The worse Sino Indian relations, the more China’s role in 
South Asia acquires problematic dimensions. But the better the relationship between India and 
China, the better it is for India’s relations with its own neighbours in South Asia. This is because most 
of the other smaller South Asian countries view China favourably. China has also initiated its Silk 
Route Project which India’s neighbours have responded to very positively. India currently has not 
responded to this officially. India feels that this project would need to be discussed with itself since 
India was crucial in shaping the silk route just as much as China was. The Silk Route project is most 
certainly a grandiose project, which has the vision of connecting land and maritime routes and trade 
links between Asia and Europe. This project talks about infrastructure developments, linking 
countries with each other and also connecting trade routes. Needless to say that the project involves 
huge sums of money, which India cannot afford. India feels that some degree of dialogue is 
necessary between India and China before the project develops any further. 
Finally, when one talks about balance of power in the Asia Pacific, one also needs to 
consider the role played by the US, and how countries like India and China view the role of the US in 
Asia. It is clear from the speeches of the Obama administration and Prime Minister Modi that India’s 
foreign policy in recent years has been tilting more and more to the US. It could be argued that the 
Chinese have been playing a role in this, in pushing India towards the US. The more China flexes its 
muscles in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the more apprehensive India will become and 
will try and look for help elsewhere. The Chinese are aware of India’s relations with the U.S, Japan, 
Vietnam and Australia, and there is concern from the side of the Chinese who feel a bit besieged by 
the Americans because of the growing partnership between India and America. Indo American 
partnership includes the civilian nuclear deal, defence agreements, American investment in India 
and a whole range of other items. When India is trying to deal with other countries, China should not 
feel nervous but rather see this as India’s attempt to multilaterally engage with countries in the Asia 
Pacific and beyond and to engage with multiple players in the international arena to diversify its own 
options rather than putting all its eggs in one basket. That said, the Indian tilt towards the Americans 
has increasingly become pronounced in recent times. To counter this, China of course has its own 
alliances too in the Asia Pacific especially with countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar but 
currently the Chinese are no match for the Americans. The need of the hour is for both India and 
China to have a free and candid discussion on what the role of the US should be in the Asia Pacific.  
 ‘For most of the participants in the Asia Pacific, hegemony management is about the US and 
two potential claimants: China and Japan’ (Bobrow, 1999). Potential hegemons are often suspicious 
of one another and thus it has been predicted that countries like China and Japan are unlikely to join 
hands together against the US under any circumstances other than very extreme ones even though 
they may each use potential cooperation to bargain with the US. The balance of power in any region 
is never quite straightforward, and there is much talk in the academic literature about the decline of 
the US, and the rise of China in the Asia Pacific. Many of the smaller countries of South East Asia 
have expressed an interest in American presence in the region because this then balances China and 
checks the rise of Chinese hegemony. There is no doubt that the way Sino-American relations play 
out in the Asia Pacific will have a profound impact on the region (Beeson and Stone, 2014). Both 
countries seem to suffer from some sort of a superiority complex in international affairs and this is 
unfortunate (Ibid). It has often been argued that Asians are incapable of managing their own 
regional conflicts and overcoming their historical animosities and in this context American presence 
in the region becomes all the more necessary to maintain peace, security and stability. The rather 
paradoxical reality that this has necessitated fighting in a series of bloody wars from Afghanistan to 
Vietnam is often not given enough attention by scholars. Whatever the role of the US maybe in 
terms of global peacekeeping, China has been increasingly modernizing its defence forces as a 
consequence of its growing wealth and has also started to deploy its military in its pursuit of struggle 
for status (Ibid). American security and prosperity depends increasingly on the development of Asia 
and it has been argued that the US is as much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic one (Wenzhao, 1999). 
American policy makers believe that stability and order in the Asia Pacific are ‘fundamental 
prerequisites for U.S. security’ (Ibid). Although the security environment in Asia since the ending of 
the Cold War has changed considerably, the US political elite have maintained that it is still by and 
large a region that is fraught with peril and uncertainty. The U.S network of alliances in Asia is a 
legacy of the Cold War period, but many of the networks did not disappear with the Cold War. The 
U.S regards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a major threat to U.S. security in the 
post-Cold War era and has emphasised on non-proliferation. The U.S has worked towards promoting 
the signing of international conventions against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their carriers. Washington has especially 
kept a close eye on countries like India, Pakistan and North Korea and pays special attention on the 
non nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. China shares the U.S goal of maintaining stability and 
security on the Korean peninsula. According to the Americans, democracy should also be pursued as 
a process that evolves in accordance with economic growth and social progress, otherwise this will 
lead to chaos. Finally, it should be mentioned that the U.S has important interests, both economic 
and strategic in the Asia Pacific, and these interests are likely to increase in the years to come. Some 
of these American interests may overlap with that of other Asian countries, whereas in some other 
cases there may be a conflict of interests e.g. nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan in 1998. It 
thus becomes necessary to analyse each specific case to make an assessment of the role of the US in 
the region and the impact that it will have on the balance of power in the region.  
So when we apply Segal’s last and final component to our case studies, the picture does not 
look good because there are clear conflicting spheres of influence especially as far as India and China 
are concerned, which destabilises the balance of power in the Asia Pacific. In this connection it 
should be mentioned that there is a lot of talk about mistrust between the two countries. Although 
India has had relations with China for centuries and exported Buddhism to China, after the 1962 war, 
much of this has been forgotten from the Indian side. Currently, large sections in the Indian political 
elite at New Delhi now see the Chinese as threatening and treacherous and trying to grab Indian 
territory in Kashmir and the Indian northeast. But more than the element of lack of trust, there is 
also a knowledge deficit from the Indian side. India has not made a real attempt to study Chinese 
culture and language. It has not made an effort to try and understand Chinese society, its politics 
and its people. There are not many departments in Indian universities where Chinese is taught. In 
countries like Britain, universities have done a good job of opening up Chinese language centres and 
many universities in the UK have a Confucius Institute to study China. But we do not see a similar 
trend happening in India1. The Chinese have made an effort to try and understand Indian culture and 
a lot of translation work has happened in this regard, but India needs to go a long way in trying to 
understand China. There aren’t that many Indian scholars or students who are seriously trying to 
understand China. Before engaging with China, one first of all has to know China. In this context 
having knowledge about China is very important. Education cooperation, joint research projects 
between India and China, more translation work and cultural exchange programs is the need of the 
hour to bridge this gap.   
 
CONCLUSION: 
 In conclusion it could be said from a security standpoint, the region that this paper has 
considered, still seems to be quite unstable.  When we apply the Segal model most of the boxes 
remain un-ticked. Although economic cooperation between India and China has increased in recent 
years and we spoke about the concept of ‘Chindia’, the boundary dispute still remains. Security 
analysts from the Indian side especially view China with considerable suspicion, although the 
economists are more optimistic (Holslag, 2010). Although there has been a major shift in the way 
China views India from the 90’s and we spoke about China’s even handed approach, the two 
countries still have a long way to go in building trust. More than mistrust, there is a knowledge 
                                                          
1
 Participant Observation in the UK and India, 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
deficit primarily from the Indian side, which India needs to rectify. There are still conflicting spheres 
of influence. Just as India does not want to see China in South Asia, China does not want to see India 
play an active role in East Asia. At a global stage, China has also not shown much support for India 
when India has tried to acquire a seat in the Security Council. India’s economic relations with 
neighbouring Pakistan are still not good because of the on-going Kashmir problem. When we look at 
the nature of the political systems of the countries in the region, most of the countries are still very 
much authoritarian, or at best hybrid regimes.  India is the only democratic system and that also a 
very messy democracy. The rising tide of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India, particularly since 
2014, is likely to weaken Indian democratic credentials further. Regional organisations like the 
SAARC have also not proven to be very effective in bringing the countries closer and bridging 
differences. So when we apply the four ingredients that Segal talks about to our case studies, apart 
from improving economic ties between India and China, the rest of the boxes cannot be ticked, and 
from this standpoint the future looks bleak. However, if democratising tendencies strengthen in all 
the case studies, economic cooperation increases and the SAARC begins to play a much more 
effective role in bringing the countries together then the prospects for peace look good. Until that 
happens it seems that a security community or liberal peace is not possible in the region that this 
paper has considered.     
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